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Less volatile growth?
The role of regional
financial institutions
José Luis Machinea and Daniel Titelman
T he volatility of economic growth in the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean has been exacerbated by a lack of 
suitable instruments for smoothing external shocks. Difficulties with 
the provision of emergency financing and the development of financial 
markets capable of trading government securities that incorporate 
better contingency mechanisms have contributed to economic volatility. 
To identify routes towards progress with these two issues in the Latin 
American context, the present article examines the role that could be 
played by regional and subregional financial institutions, always bearing 
in mind that while these can supplement global institutions, they cannot 
supplant them.
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Since the Asian crisis of 1997, it has been more widely 
recognized that the volatility of international financial 
markets is an important factor in the business cycles of 
emerging economies, as it creates new disequilibria in 
domestic economies and magnifies existing ones. The 
countries of Latin America have been no exception, 
since the shocks caused by volatility in external financial 
markets have been one of the main causes of growth 
volatility. Thus, the impact that natural resource prices 
have had for decades on the region’s business cycle 
has now been compounded by international financial 
markets. Although natural resource prices have once 
again been making a large contribution to Latin 
America’s economic boom in recent years, a longer-
term view shows that capital movements are the factor 
that has most influenced economic cycles over the last 
three decades.
The financial volatility of the region’s countries has 
been exacerbated by the lack of suitable mechanisms 
for providing emergency f inancing to countries 
experiencing balance-of-payments financing problems 
as a result of external shocks. The lack of an emergency 
financing network at the regional and international level 
has led countries to move towards a policy of self-
insurance consisting essentially in the accumulation 
of international reserves, which is very far from 
being the most efficient option for protecting against 
the vagaries of the world economy. In recent years 
there has been a flurry of proposals for reforming 
world financial institutions and markets. However, 
the strategies developed to improve global financial 
arrangements have underplayed the potential role of 
regional financial institutions.
With a view to identifying more efficient ways 
of coping with external shocks in the Latin American 
context, this article discusses the role that could be 
played by regional f inancial institutions, without 
forgetting that these need to be seen as supplementing 
global institutions rather than replacing them.
In relation to such institutions, the primary focus 
of this article is on the potential for extending the 
geographical coverage of the Latin American Reserve 
Fund (FLAR). It then goes on to discuss the need to 
stimulate the development of financial markets for 
government securities with characteristics that make 
contingencies easier to cope with.
The ability of a reserve pool to cushion the impact 
of external shocks depends on the “insureds” not all 
being affected by these simultaneously. At first sight, a 
correlation analysis of such shocks in 10 Latin American 
economies indicates that, indeed, the countries are not 
thus affected and that it would accordingly be possible 
to extend the regional coverage of the Latin American 
Reserve Fund. The correlation ratios for detrended 
series of international reserves tend to be low or non-
significant, terms-of-trade correlations do not show a 
clear pattern either, and private capital inflows present 
correlations that are positive but generally not close to 
unity. In addition, a regional fund could help to curb 
mechanisms of crisis transmission between countries, 
thereby reducing the correlation between them.
By joining a reserve pool, countries benefit from 
access to a larger volume of reserves and, depending on 
the individual case, a possible reduction in the volatility 
of these. The estimated coverage ratio, which combines 
both effects, suggests that countries whose reserves have 
low volatility in relation to their size would have few 
incentives to join a reserve pool. Of the 10 countries 
examined in this paper, those with the lowest reserve 
volatility, Chile and Colombia, would be reducing their 
levels of coverage by joining a reserve pool because 
both would have lower effective reserves than if they 
self-insured, resulting in incentive problems.
Moves towards regional financial development 
involving the issuance on international markets of 
government securities incorporating better contingency 
mechanisms, such as bonds indexed to gross domestic 
product (GDP), bonds indexed to commodity prices 
and local currency-denominated government bonds 
indexed to domestic inflation, have been hindered by 
coordination problems, lack of credibility and failures 
of transparency and surveillance. For progress to be 
made in this area, it is proposed that subregional 
development banks and the Latin American Reserve 
I
Introduction
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Fund should join the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the World Bank in their efforts to stimulate 
these markets.
Lastly, further financial integration will require 
greater macroeconomic coordination. Progress by 
the Latin American countries in this area, which has 
been very limited, could be stimulated by soft forms 
of coordination that do not pursue the most ambitious 
goals but recognize that the process had to be gradual. 
Information-sharing and the creation of supranational 
forums for policy debate seem to be a good starting 
point. Over time, strengthening coordination would 




Despite the region’s improved growth rate over recent 
years, the longer-term picture is discouraging. In the 
1980-2006 period, the growth rate was low (2.4% a 
year on average) in relation both to the region’s own 
past and to the behaviour of other developing countries 
(table 1). As well as being low, growth rates have been 
extremely volatile. Indeed, real volatility in the region 
has increased substantially since the 1980s and is, 
on average, more than twice as high as in the rest of 
the developing world (figure 1). Higher volatility has 
exacerbated uncertainty and adversely affected saving 
and investment decisions, and the resultant negative 
effects on the growth rate have hit lower-income sectors 
hardest (ECLAC, 2000 and 2004).
The factors behind the increased volatility of 
growth in the region are both internal and external. 
Internal factors include procyclical macroeconomic 
policies, low saving and investment rates and shallow 
financial markets.
TABLE 1
Annual growth rates, selected periods
(Average annual rates)
 Developed Developing Latin America
 economies countries (19 countries)
1980-1990 3.1 3.3 1.1
1990-2006 2.4 4.8 2.9
1980-2006 2.6 4.3 2.4
Source: ECLAC.
In particular, financial markets in most of the 
region’s countries are still oriented towards the short 
term and focused essentially on banking operations, 
while capital markets are very underdeveloped. In 
addition, they are still highly dollarized and credit 
rationing and high real interest rates are widely 
encountered. Consequently, the expansion of financial 
activities has not translated into the development of 
financial intermediation instruments that could help 
to increase liquidity and mitigate the fluctuations of 
economic activity. The result has been that financial 
markets have tended to accentuate economic cycles 
(figure 2).
As well as being a response to domestic factors, 
GDP volatility has been closely associated with 
external shocks (Ffrench-Davis, 2005; ECLAC, 2000, 
2001 and 2004).
Throughout much of the region’s history, these 
shocks were associated with variations in the terms 
of trade. In recent decades, however, the volatility 
of financial markets has replaced commodity price 
movements as the main source of external shocks, a 
tendency that became more pronounced during the 
1990s. This was due to two concurrent factors: an 
increase in the size and volatility of capital flows 
and a reduction in the volatility of the terms of trade, 
the latter being associated with the diversification 
of exports in most of the region’s countries (ECLAC, 
2004; López-Monti, 2005). Consequently, although 
the terms of trade have played a central role in Latin 
America’s economic recovery in recent years, over the 
last three decades it is capital movements that have 
been the main external factor in the region’s volatility 
(figure 3).
The impact of capital movements on growth 
volatility is not something peculiar to Latin America. 
The fact is that volatility and contagion were among the 
main characteristics of the rapid expansion of worldwide 
financial flows in the 1990s, channelled through the 
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FIGURE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean, world, and developing countries:
Volatility of growth rates
(Coefficients of variation, 10-year moving averages)
FIGURE 2
Latin America (seven countries): Credit to the private sector and economic activity
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FIGURE 3
Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth and financial flows
TABLE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: External financing sources, 1990-2006a
(Percentages of GDP)
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
A. Debt 0.7 1.4 2.9 2.7 0.7 2.1 0.9 0.7 1.4 -1.1 -0.9 -0.3 -1.2 -0.6 -2.0 -2.3 -1.7
 Loansb -0.1 0.6 0.9 -1.2 -2.2 2.3 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 -1.9 -0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 -1.5 -2.4 -1.7
 Bonds  0.8 0.8 2.0 3.9 2.9 -0.1 1.5 0.8 1.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 0.1 0.0
B. Investment 0.8 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.6 1.8 2.8 3.5 2.9 4.1 3.4 3.4 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.4 1.2
 Direct 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.9 3.1 4.6 3.6 3.4 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.2
 Equity 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.6 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0
C. Otherb -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.4 0..8 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
D. Worker remittances 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1
Total capital inflows plus 
 remittances (A+B+C+D) 2.4 4.0 5.6 5.8 3.9 4.7 4.5 4.9 4.9 4.0 4.0 4.2 2.7 3.3 2.2 2.2 1.6
Total capital inflows 
 (A+B+C) 1.5 3.0 4.5 4.8 3.0 3.7 3.6 4.0 3.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 0.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5
Source: ECLAC, with information from the IMF.
a Calculated on the basis of gdp in current dollars. The 2006 data are preliminary estimates.
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Everything suggests that the region will remain 
exposed to external shocks, whether these derive from 
variations in the terms of trade or fluctuations in capital 
movements. This is why the countries have sought to 
reduce their vulnerability to such potential shocks.
In effect, greater fiscal discipline and a regionwide 
current-account surplus have positively affected all 
indicators relating to short-term liquidity needs. 
These include the ratios between short-term external 
debt and international reserves, between external 
debt and exports2 and between public debt and GDP.3 
These improvements, which have reduced the region’s 
vulnerability to external shocks, should not make us 
forget that capital movements are volatile by nature, 
or that a number of countries still have balance sheet 
problems, mainly relating to currency mismatches 
in the financial structures of businesses, financial 
institutions and the public sector. Again, while the 
public debt/GDP ratio has fallen, a number of countries 
still have public debt levels close to 50%, which seems 
quite high (figure 4).
One characteristic of the policies brought in to 
reduce external vulnerability has been the increasing 
use of self-insurance, either through large increases in 
international reserves or, in some cases, through the 
creation of stabilization funds. Maintaining international 
reserves as an insurance mechanism has proved costly 
and inefficient, since returns on reserves are lower 
than those on other, less liquid assets. Furthermore, 
the inadequacy of infrastructure and social services 
means that the opportunity cost of holding reserves 
can be high.
The logic of self-insurance rests on the fact that, 
during the 1990s, global financial institutions and 
markets had no mechanisms for providing emergency 
loans to supply liquidity for balance-of-payments 
financing and thus help protect countries from the 
vagaries of capital flows. In addition, the crises brought 
to light the failings of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and its slowness in providing assistance 
to emerging economies, perhaps because the scale of 
the problem far exceeded the resources and capabilities 
available. In most cases, however, the lack of assistance 
can be put down to an attitude that treated adjustments 
in the region’s economies as a one-size-fits-all response 
to external shocks.
The financial vulnerability of the Latin American 
countries has also been heightened by the lack of deep, 
liquid financial markets at the national, regional and 
international levels, which has hindered the development 
of securities with better cyclical properties than foreign 
currency-denominated bonds. It has proved very difficult 
to interest investors in government securities such as 
GDP-indexed bonds, bonds indexed to international 
prices for leading export products, and local currency-
III
Responses to external vulnerability
banking system and through the bond, share and 
financial derivatives markets. Despite macroeconomic 
and institutional reforms in the Latin American countries 
and internationally, these phenomena have persisted and 
capital flows into Latin America and other developing 
regions remain volatile (Ocampo and Martin, 2003; 
Caballero, Cowan and Kearns, 2004).
As table 2 indicates, the sharp fluctuations in 
capital inflows since 1990 have been due essentially 
to debt and portfolio investment trends. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has also fluctuated, but it has been far 
more stable than all other forms of financing except 
immigrants’ remittances, which rose steadily to reach 
2.2% of regional GDP in 2005.1
1 Although changes in capital movements are usually calculated in 
terms of GDP, it should be emphasized that their impact on economic 
activity depends on their effect on the current account, owing to the 
import adjustments they generate. Thus, the more open a country’s 
economy, the smaller the adjustments in the real exchange rate and 
economic activity level that will be needed to balance the current 
account (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2003).
2 This is not true, however, of a number of countries in the Caribbean 
where the ratio between external debt and exports has not fallen but 
remains very high.
3 These indicators present a similar pattern in the region to that 
of developing countries in other regions. In almost all emerging 
economies, short-term debt has declined on average while the 
ratio between short-term external debt and reserves has improved. 
In addition to all these indicators, the region has moved towards 
flexible exchange rates in recent years, and this too has reduced 
vulnerability to external shocks (ECLAC, 2006a and 2006b; Machinea 
and Kacef, 2006).
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FIGURE 4
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): Vulnerability indicators
 Short-term external debt/international reservesa Total external debt/exportsa
 Public debt/GDP a Local-currency public debt/total public debt
Dollarization of deposits (2006)
Source: ECLAC (2006a).
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denominated bonds.4 The lack of instruments of this 
type has heightened financial volatility.
In view of all this, there have been a number of 
proposals for reforming global financial institutions and 
markets (Ocampo, 2002; Caballero, 2003; Calvo, 2005). 
However, strategies for improving global financial 
arrangements have underestimated the role that can 
be played by regional financial institutions in solving 
these problems.
More active involvement for regional institutions is 
justified on a number of counts. First, the contagion effect 
produced by financial crises has major repercussions 
throughout the region. Second, regional agreements have 
resulted in increased intraregional trade and investment 
flows. Third, macroeconomic ties have strengthened and 
the externalities generated within a given country by the 
macroeconomic policies of its neighbours are greater 
than they used to be (Ocampo, 2006; Culpeper, 2006; 
Machinea and Rozenwurcel, 2006).
Given all this, regional and subregional funds acting 
as ‘lenders of last resort’ could usefully complement 
the work done by the IMF in this way (Mistry, 1999; 
Agosin, 2001). Since the Asian crisis of 1997, in fact, 
there have been growing calls for regional financial 
cooperation to establish mechanisms that might prevent 
the outbreak of new financial crises. Specifically, 
the main demands have been for emergency lending 
and the development of deeper, more liquid financial 
markets. Recent examples are the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(Thailand), launched in 2000 and involving both the 
creation of a short-term liquidity facility via a network 
of bilateral currency swaps, and the creation of an Asian 
bond market with a view to establishing a fully fledged 
regional bond market.
In what follows, we shall concentrate on the 
contribution of existing regional financial institutions 
in Latin America to emergency financing and the 
development of financial instruments as means of 
stabilizing financial flows into developing countries and 
reducing their vulnerability.
IV
Financial integration in Latin America
1. Reserve pooling
The Latin American countries have been building 
up reserves since the early 1990s (figure A.1 in the 
appendix). This is largely due to the need to protect 
their economies from possible changes in the external 
context, particularly variations in capital flows. A 
heightening of this tendency since 2002 has been 
reflected in a large rise in the ratio of international 
reserves to short-term debt, which is one indicator 
of an economy’s ability to cope with external shocks. 
Meanwhile, the reserves/imports ratio has not risen 
greatly, suggesting that the countries are not building 
up reserves as a way of protecting themselves against 
trade risks (figure 5).
What is now the Latin American Reserve Fund 
(FLAR) was created in 1978 as the Andean Reserve Fund 
to serve the countries of the Andean Community. Only 
a few of the region’s countries are FLAR participants: 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The fund acts 
as a credit cooperative that uses a variety of credit 
facilities to lend to member countries’ central banks in 
proportion to the capital they have contributed.5 FLAR 
4 High yields on the bonds indexed to the level of economic activity 
in Argentina that were issued at the time of the debt restructuring 
may change this perception and make it easier to sell this type of 
instrument in future.
5 (i) Credits for balance-of-payments support are issued for a three-
year term, with a one-year grace period, capped at 2.5 times the 
paid-up capital (except for Bolivia and Ecuador, where it is 3.5 times 
the paid-up capital), and their approval requires the consent of the 
board of directors; (ii) credits for restructuring the external national 
debt are issued for a three-year term, with a one-year grace period, 
capped at 1.5 times the paid-up capital, and their approval requires 
the consent of the board of directors; (iii) liquidity credits are issued 
for a term of up to one year, capped at 1.0 times the paid-up capital, 
and their approval requires the authorization of the chief executive 
officer; (iv) standby credits are issued for a term of up to six months, 
capped at 2.0 times the paid-up capital, and their approval requires 
the authorization of the chief executive officer; (v) treasury credits 
(repos) are issued for a term of from one to thirty days, capped at 2.0 
times the paid-up capital and 50% collateralized, and their approval 
requires the authorization of the chief executive officer.
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C. Reserves/goods and services imports
(Months)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of World Bank, Global Development Finance (various years) and World Development Indicators (various 
years).
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TABLE 3
Latin America: Disbursements by the Andean Reserve Fund/Latin American Reserve 
Fund and exceptional financing by the International Monetary Funda
(Millions of dollars)
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Disbursements 
Totalb 15 18 39 53 158 364 686 284 440 291 251 390 390 451 20   234 34  494 125    156
Bolivia   39 53 53 53 30 165 190  28 96 121 48 20           
Colombia      50 529 85              125    
Ecuador     105 67 127 34 250  93 54 117     234 34  494     
Costa Rica                          156
Peru 15 18    195    20 130 240 129 403            
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)          271   23             
Exceptional financing
by the International Monetary Fund 
Totalc 145 267 261 62 358 532 147 121 224 49 169 1 052 1 906 449 57 897 186 26 557 244 46 23 165 72 98 
Bolivia 38 11 96  27 19   135  91 58 31 31 51  44 26 49 23 46 23 15 24  
Ecuador      218 40 86 89 49 78 20 32 25   142      150 48 98 
Costa Rica  27 20 62  119  35      76 6           
Peru 107 229 145  331 176 107         897    221      
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)            974 1 843 317     508       
yb c 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.7 4.7 2.3 2.0 5.9 1.5 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.4   9.0 0.1  10.7 5.4   
Source: Titelman, 2006.
a The Latin American Reserve Fund accounting year runs from July to June, whereas the International Monetary Fund uses calendar 
years.
b Latin American Reserve Fund contingency financing is not broken down by country because it is zero for every year. The same applies 
to disbursements for debt restructuring purposes, except for 1995 and 2003, when funds worth US$ 200 million and US$ 156 million 
were disbursed to Ecuador and Costa Rica, respectively. Latin American Reserve Fund disbursements do not include countries that had 
zero disbursements for any reason throughout the 1978-2004 period.
c International Monetary Fund disbursements do not include the reserve tranche.
has three objectives: (i) to provide financial support 
for its member countries’ balances of payments; (ii) to 
improve the terms for its member countries’ reserves 
investments; and (iii) to help harmonize its member 
countries’ monetary and financial policies.
FLAR has been quite successful in providing short-
term financing to its member countries. Between its 
creation and the end of 2003, FLAR disbursed credits 
worth a total of US$ 4.9 billion, consisting chiefly of 
credits for balance-of-payments support and liquidity 
credits. During the worst years of the 1982-1984 
debt crisis, FLAR increased its resource contributions 
significantly. This was also done in the 1996 and 
1998-1999 crises (table 3). During the period from 
1978 to 2003, FLAR contributed resources equivalent, 
on average, to 60% of the amount of IMF exceptional 
financing provided to the Andean Community countries 
(Titelman, 2006).
An important feature of FLAR financing is its 
speed and timeliness. Depending on the type of credit, 
loan approvals require the authorization of either the 
board of directors, which is made up of member 
countries’ central banks, or else the chief executive 
officer. This arrangement has resulted in speedy and 
timely financing, giving FLAR an operational advantage 
over the IMF. This fact was not necessarily reflected 
in the amounts of resources provided, but rather in the 
relevance of the credits. The sense of ownership that 
countries feel towards FLAR is reflected in the preferred 
creditor status its member countries have given it. The 
countries’ central banks must register any loans granted 
by FLAR as liabilities in their international reserves 
account, thereby providing an additional guarantee of 
repayment. The preferred creditor status of FLAR is 
reflected in its present Moody’s rating of Aa2 and its 
Standard & Poor’s rating of A+. 
One of the benefits for countries that join a reserve 
pool is that they gain access to increased reserve 
holdings. When their debt capacity with FLAR is 
added to the member countries’ international reserves, 
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the short-term debt/international reserves ratio drops 
significantly in some cases (Bolivia, Costa Rica and 
Ecuador) (table 4).
The fact that FLAR has played a quite successful 
role in providing short-term balance-of-payments 
financing to its member countries raises the question as 
to the feasibility of expanding its membership. A first 
element to consider is the correlation of external shocks 
across countries. High positive correlation ratios weaken 
the arguments for a reserve pool, as most contributing 
countries, being similarly affected by external shocks, 
would need to draw on the fund simultaneously. 
However, even in the presence of positive correlations, 
reserve pooling can still be useful if shocks affect 
different countries with different intensities, since this 
allows some of the reserves of countries experiencing 
lower effects to be lent to countries suffering more 
severe effects.6 Furthermore, lending at the onset of a 
liquidity squeeze could prevent or cushion a crisis in 
a given country and thus reduce contagion in others. 
Lastly, the ability of FLAR to borrow from financial 
markets can also help to overcome shocks that have 
similar effects on the different countries.
Coefficients of correlation between international 
reserves, private capital inflows and the terms of 
trade were calculated for the 1990-2005 period 
across a sample of 10 countries to obtain an initial 
assessment of correlation. The actual FLAR countries 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) were supplemented 
by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The results are 
summarized in table A.1 of the appendix.
Correlation coefficients between the countries’ 
international reserves are significant (at a 5% level) 
in 32 out of 45 cases and tend to be quite high. These 
coefficients may, however, be magnified by the fact that, 
as previously mentioned, all countries in the sample 
show an upward trend in reserve accumulation during 
the period considered (figure A.1 in the appendix). To 
tackle this issue we used the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
to detrend the series. Correlation coefficients dropped 
significantly for most countries, and some coefficients 
lost significance (only 17 out of 45 were significant at 
the 5% level). When the exercise is done using annual 
changes in international reserves, correlations tend to 
be low and non-significant.
The size of external shocks is not fully reflected in 
international reserve movements, however, since their 
effects on the level of these reserves are influenced 
by countries’ exchange-rate policies. This has become 
even truer in recent years owing to the regional trend 
TABLE 4
Latin America (six countries): Influence of the Andean Reserve Fund/Latin American 
Reserve Fund on financial vulnerability, March 2003
(Short-term debt/international reserves)
 Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Peru Bolivarian Republic
      of Venezuela
Subscribed capital 234 469 234 234 469 469
Paid-up capital 157 313 133 157 313 313
IMF quotas  233 1 053 222 414 878 3 721
Short-term debt 370 3 800 1 499 2 316 2 335 3 720
Reserves 893 10 844 1 497 1 004 9 721 12 107
Short-term debt/international reserves 41 35 100 231 24 31
(percentages)
Short-term debt/increased international 26 33 82 149 22 29
reserves (percentages)a
Source: Titelman, 2006. Prepared by the author using official data from the countries, flar and the IMF.
a  The quotient of short-term debt over increased international reserves is calculated by adding to international reserves the country’s 
capacity for borrowing from FAR/FLAR, this being 2.5 times the paid-up capital except in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, where it is 
3.5 times.
6 Differences in impact depend not just on the scale of the shock 
in different countries, but also on the production structure and 
macroeconomic conditions of each.
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towards greater currency flexibility, which facilitates 
adjustment via relative prices when shocks of this 
kind occur. Despite this shift towards greater formal 
currency flexibility, there are clear constraints on large 
exchange-rate movements. Apart from the impact on 
inflation and real wages, adjustments of this type 
affect the balance sheets of companies and the public 
sector, owing to the significant level of dollarization 
in a number of economies. In other words, when 
there are large currency mismatches between the 
assets and liabilities of the financial sector or the 
productive sector, a considerable depreciation over a 
short period will have a strong adverse impact on GDP. 
Consequently, the level of international reserves still 
has a key role to play in smoothing external shocks 
and averting these negative effects.
In view of this, we supplemented our analysis of 
international reserve dynamics by examining correlations 
in terms-of-trade and capital flow movements between 
countries, although changes in capital flows are also 
influenced by exchange-rate policy. As for the terms 
of trade, correlation coefficients between countries 
do not present a consistent pattern. What emerges is 
a combination of negative and positive coefficients 
of differing sizes; only 15 of the 45 coefficients are 
positive and significant —unsurprisingly, since a review 
of the terms of trade in Latin American countries 
over recent years shows that tendencies have been 
heterogeneous. The terms of trade have worsened in 
the Central American countries (by 12% on average 
between 1990 and 2005), while they improved by an 
average of 31% in the South American countries over 
the same period. Furthermore, the positive average for 
South America includes a number of countries where 
the terms of trade have deteriorated.7
The conclusions for private capital inflows are 
similar to those for the terms of trade: there is no 
clearly defined pattern here either. Positive coefficients 
are not close to unity in most cases, and most of them 
are small and non-significant. In general, negative 
correlations are not significant either. These results 
agree with those reported by Urrutia (2006) and 
Agosin (2001) for another sample of Latin American 
countries. In a similar framework, Machinea (2003) 
calculated that coefficients in the MERCOSUR countries 
were mainly positive but small and, in some instances, 
non-significant.
The results suggest that expanding the membership 
of the Latin American Reserve Fund to the new 
countries considered in the correlation analysis would 
be feasible, and that countries would not experience 
financial shocks that were similar or of the same 
severity. In addition, a regional fund could help to 
curb mechanisms of crisis transmission between 
countries.8
The need to accumulate international reserves 
partly depends on their volatility. This being so, 
reserve pooling benefits member countries by giving 
them access to a larger volume of reserves or reducing 
average volatility. Countries whose international 
reserves are low in relation to their volatility will 
usually benefit from pooling with countries that have 
larger reserves. The opposite also holds true, of course, 
with countries whose international reserves are of low 
volatility suffering adverse effects by pooling with 
countries where volatility ratios are higher.
Following Williams, Polius and Hazel (2001) 
and Eichengreen (2006), we calculated the degree of 
protection implied by international reserves in view of 
their size and variability. Equation 1 defines coverage 
for a country i as the ratio between reserve holdings 
and their variability. Coverage increases as international 
reserves rise or as their volatility falls:
 (1)
where Ri is the average level of reserves during a 
given time period and VAR (Ri) is their variability 
during the same time period. When a country joins 
the reserve pool, it will gain access to higher reserve 
holdings but it will also be affected by the volatility in 
other countries’ reserves. Country i will benefit from 
pooling if the variability of the pool is lower than that 
7 Although the terms of trade are a good indicator of real external 
shocks, they are difficult to estimate in the short term. A more 
transparent, quickly obtainable and thus useful indicator for the 
purposes of emergency financing access are the prices of the 
commodities exported by the region’s countries. Using export prices 
as a proxy, the analysis shows a more consistent pattern of correlation 
between countries (27 positive and significant coefficients out of a 
total of 45 for the 1990-2005 period), although in a number of cases 
these coefficients are not close to unity (see appendix).
8 Agosin (2000) calculates that if a reserve fund were endowed with 
15% of the reserves of the 11 countries in the region (including all 
the large countries except Mexico), it could provide financing to cope 
with capital outflows equivalent to the entire short-term foreign debt 
of all the countries under the arrangement.
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of its individual reserves, or if the increased access to 
reserves outweighs the higher variability of the pool. 
The coverage ratio for country i becomes:
 (2)
In this equation, ρ is the degree of pooling
0≤ ρ ≤1, Ri is the total reserves of country i and Rj 
is country j’s reserves. That is, with partial pooling, 
country i’s total access to reserves equals all its own 
reserves plus the partially pooled reserves of all other 
members of the pool.
Table 5 shows the mean, standard deviation and 
volatility coefficient of international reserves in the 
10 countries analysed for the period 1990-2005. The 
volatility coefficients range from 0.56 for Mexico to 
0.19 for Chile. Table 6 summarizes the coverage ratios 
calculated using equation (2) for different values of 
ρ. The results show that the countries with the lowest 
reserve volatility, Chile and Colombia, would lose 
coverage by joining the reserve pool, since both would 
experience a decline in effective reserves as compared 
to self-insurance. The rest of the countries improve their 
situation with pooling. Mexico is one of those gaining 
the most, followed by Ecuador and Peru. These three 
countries are the ones that have the highest volatility 
coefficients. These results imply that expanding the 
membership of the Latin American Reserve Fund is 
not straightforward, and that there might be incentive 
problems for countries with high reserves relative to 
their volatility if they were to join the fund.
TABLE 5
Latin America (10 countries):
Reserve variability, 1990-2005a
 Mean Standard Variation
  deviation coefficient
Bolivia 1 226 447 0.36
Colombia 9 916 2 443 0.25
Costa Rica 1 478 479 0.32
Ecuador 1 634 656 0.40
Peru 9 109 3 480 0.38
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 16 034 5 277 0.33
Argentina 18 597 6 445 0.35
Brazil 43 106 14 342 0.33
Chile 14 832 2 829 0.19
Mexico 35 425 19 825 0.56
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the IMF (various 
years).
a The measure of volatility used was the variation coefficient (the 
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean).
TABLE 6
Latin America (10 countries): Coverage ratios, 1990-2005
 p=0 p=0.1 p=0.2 p=0.3 p=0.4 p=0.5 p=0.6 p=0.7 p=0.8 p=0.9 p=1
Bolivia 2.74 3.38 3.41 3.41 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42
Colombia 4.06 3.69 3.57 3.52 3.49 3.47 3.45 3.44 3.44 3.43 3.42
Costa Rica 3.09 3.44 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.42
Ecuador 2.49 3.38 3.41 3.41 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42
Peru 2.62 3.12 3.25 3.32 3.35 3.37 3.39 3.40 3.41 3.42 3.42
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 3.04 3.38 3.44 3.45 3.45 3.44 3.44 3.44 3.43 3.43 3.42
Argentina 2.89 3.47 3.56 3.56 3.54 3.51 3.49 3.47 3.45 3.44 3.42
Brazil 3.01 3.29 3.43 3.49 3.51 3.50 3.49 3.48 3.46 3.44 3.42
Chile 5.24 4.28 3.92 3.74 3.64 3.57 3.53 3.49 3.46 3.44 3.42
Mexico 1.79 2.18 2.48 2.71 2.90 3.04 3.15 3.24 3.31 3.37 3.42
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the IMF (various years).
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Imperfections in the financial market have held back 
the financial integration of Latin American economies 
with international markets (Ocampo and Martin, 2003; 
ECLAC, 2000; Calvo, 2002; Caballero, 2003). The 
lack of suitable instruments for hedging and insuring 
against the risk of a sudden halt in capital flows and 
a sharp alteration in the terms of trade (such as bonds 
indexed to output growth or the price of export goods) 
has a very high economic cost for the Latin American 
countries.9 Furthermore, the two tend to compound 
each other, since a deterioration in the terms of trade 
adversely affects borrowing conditions. The result is 
that the financial markets intensify the economic cycle 
instead of smoothing it.
Exchange-rate flexibility does not solve the 
problem, moreover, because emerging economies, and 
Latin American ones in particular, are highly dollarized. 
The large currency mismatch that is still a feature of 
the region makes it difficult to use the exchange rate as 
a mechanism for adjusting to external shocks, owing to 
the impact on the balance sheets of companies and the 
public sector (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999).
This is why a number of f inancial market 
development proposals call, first, for a larger role for 
external borrowing in domestic currency and, second, 
for debt servicing to be tied to the evolution of the 
economy when borrowing is in foreign currency. 
Particular proposals of this type include domestic 
inflation-indexed local-currency bonds, GDP-indexed 
bonds and bonds indexed to commodity prices 
(Borensztein and Mauro, 2004; Shiller and Griffith-
Jones, 2006; Caballero, 2001). Since these securities 
are still unattractive to private investors, the task of 
developing markets for them has proved very slow and 
difficult. Coordination problems, lack of confidence 
in national policies and problems of transparency and 
surveillance are some of the factors holding back the 
creation of markets of this kind, and international 
and regional financial institutions need to be actively 
involved in supporting and facilitating this.
In the Latin American context, there are a number 
of regional and subregional actors that could give a 
major impetus to the development of such markets. 
Regionally, there are the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) and the World Bank. A number of analysts 
have proposed that the IDB should lend to Latin 
American countries in their own currencies by issuing 
inflation-linked local-currency securities (Fernández 
Aria and Cowan, 2005; Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza, 2005).
In the last two years, the IDB has been promoting 
the issuance of local-currency securities in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Peru (table 7). The investor base has been 
domestic as well as international, and the securities are 
listed on both local and international markets, which 
contributes to the price discovery process by creating 
tension between the two types of market. Also, the 
bonds add value to international capital markets by 
providing AAA risk-rated assets denominated in local 
currency to international investors, who can then 
allocate currency risk separately from credit risk. 
By issuing debt in local currency, the IDB helps to 
improve the countries’ balance sheets and contributes 
to domestic financial markets by introducing best 
practices, providing risk diversification opportunities 
to domestic investors, and providing liquidity to the 
bond and swap markets.
At the subregional level, subregional development 
banks and the Latin American Reserve Fund could play 
a similar role.10 Since the 1990s, subregional banks have 
increased their funding for the subregions. The Andean 
Development Corporation (ADC) contributes around 
56% of the total resources approved by development 
banks for the Andean Community countries. Indeed, 
the ADC has become the main source of financing 
for the Andean countries, accounting for 68% of all 
lending approved during 2002. The Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) has also 
increased its lending, albeit to a lesser extent and not 
V
Financial development
10 Eichengreen (2006) proposes that FLAR should help to support 
the development of a market in local-currency government securities 
indexed to domestic inflation or GDP. This would involve changes 
to the fund’s fiduciary responsibilities.
9 Calvo (2005) calculates the output cost of capital reversal at around 
5% of GDP in the year that follows the onset of the event. Crane 
(2005) calculates smaller effects of some 1% to 2% of GDP.
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so systematically. Compared with the World Bank and 
IDB, CABEI has contributed an average of around 40% 
of the total financing approved by these institutions 
for the Central American countries, peaking at 57% 
in 2003. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) 
accounted for around 30% of total loans approved 
by multilateral development banks between 1992 and 
2002 (table 8).
The subregional development banks have a much 
higher investment rating than their member countries.11 
This gives them a solid base for complementing IDB 
efforts in providing highly rated innovative local-
currency assets to international investors.
Developing a securities market like the ones 
proposed involves major demands in terms of statistical 
information and the transparency of economic policy 
management. Greater macroeconomic coordination 
between the region’s countries can thus boost the 
development of regional financial markets. Unfortunately, 
progress with macroeconomic cooperation and 
coordination in Latin America has been limited, 
although more has been done in the Central American 
Common Market than in the Andean Community or 
MERCOSUR. Remembering the difficulties of the past, 
not only are measures needed to enhance regional 
integration in different areas of trade and infrastructure 
(ECLAC, 2006b, chapter IV), but in the macroeconomic 
sphere there is also a need for periodic meetings, 
information-sharing, harmonization of statistics 
and the creation of supranational forums for policy 
debate.12 Although information-sharing is a restricted 
form of coordination that does not directly influence 
macroeconomic performance, it does help countries to 
become better acquainted, gain a deeper understanding 
of one another’s characteristics and situations and 
adopt a common outlook, all of which is a far cry 
from the current situation in the Latin American 
integration process (Machinea and Rozenwurcel, 2006). 
Stricter coordination would require the establishment 
of convergence goals for a set of macroeconomic 
variables. In the regional context, targets would 
have to be set for the budget deficit, inflation, the 
current-account deficit and short-term debt. Some 
of these targets could also provide the basis for the 
conditionality of the Latin American Reserve Fund, 
in the event that countries had to meet convergence 
targets to receive assistance. Given the need to establish 
feasible objectives, it must be asked how strict the rules 
would have to be. A degree of flexibility is required to 
cope with unexpected crises, but excessive flexibility 
can undermine the credibility of commitments. Despite 
this, as we have already pointed out, the benefits of 
TABLE 7
Latin America: IDB issues in Latin American currencies
 Date of Issue Currency Amount U.S. dollar Coupon Maturity
    equivalent
Brazil 11 May 2004 Real 550 million 94 million 0 5 years
Brazil 14 December 2004 Real 200 million 73 million IGPM + 6.26% 5 years
Colombia 23 June 2004 Peso 120 billion 44 million CPI + 0.54% 7 years, payable
     (issued at 
     discount)
Colombia 10 March 2005 Peso 168 billion 73 million CPI + 3.95% 7 years, payable
Chile 25 August 2005 Peso 36.3 billion 65 million 2.15% in  5 years
     development 
     units (UF)
Peru 19 May 2006 Nuevo sol 65.2 million 20 million 6.09375% 2 years
Source: García (2006).
11 Moody’s has given ratings of Aa2 to the Andean Development 
Corporation, Aaa to the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration and Baa1 to the Caribbean Development Bank.
12 Some progress has been made in this field through the ECLAC 
Macroeconomic Dialogue Network (REDIMA). See Cárcamo 
(2005).
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issuing securities with better cyclical properties ought 
to be an incentive to macroeconomic discipline and 
policy coordination.
All this means that the countries need to accept 
some loss of sovereignty and show strong political 
will to back up the necessary coordination efforts. 
This is particularly true for the larger countries in 
the agreement, for which the loss of autonomy is 
more costly (IDB, 2002, chapter 7). When economic 
interdependence between the members of an integration 
agreement is highly asymmetrical, the larger partners 
have the responsibility to provide leadership in order 
to move the integration process forward.
It is worth recalling that one of the mandates 
of the Latin American Reserve Fund is to encourage 
macroeconomic coordination between its members, 
which means that assistance at times of crisis and the 
issuance of securities with the characteristics described 
could provide incentives to carry the process forward. 
However, there is no substitute for political will on the 
part of the countries.
TABLE 8
Loans approved by development banks, 1995-2004a
(Millions of current dollars)
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
a) Andean Community countries
 IDB + World Bank 2 133 1 924 1 392 2 996 2 558 2 152 1 917 1 559 4 124 2 329
 ADC 2 258 2 314 2 900 2 673 2 182 2 323 3 198 3 290 3 304 3 503
b) Central American Common 
 Market countries          
 IDB + World Bank 876 626 593 1 233 1 027 513 1 079 1 043 513 760
 CABEI 358 569 532 932 336 330 572 680 681 800
c) CARICOM countries          
 IDB + World Bank 345 506 176 189 334 270 310 326 242 221
 CDB 92 73 51 117 137 179 85 108 185 94
Source: Titelman (2006).
a IDB: Inter-American Development Bank; ADC: Andean Development Corporation; CABEI: Central American Bank for Economic Integration; 
CDB: Caribbean Development Bank.
VI
Conclusions
External factors, especially those associated with 
capital movements, have been among the main causes 
of the volatility experienced by the region in the last 
three decades. The scale of the crises associated with 
this volatility has led to more responsible economic 
policy-making in recent years, and indicators relating to 
short-term liquidity needs have improved accordingly. 
In addition, mechanisms of self-insurance via the 
accumulation of international reserves, which tend to 
be costly and inefficient, have become an instrument 
for confronting external shocks.
If the effectiveness and efficiency of the region 
are to be improved and its vulnerability to external 
shocks thereby reduced, two things are important: 
the ability to obtain financing at reasonable rates in 
an emergency, and the development of markets for 
financial instruments that can help to reduce this 
vulnerability.
The present article argues that regional bodies 
can make an important contribution to these two 
objectives. A good example of the first is the Latin 
American Reserve Fund which, while it only covers 
a few countries, has been able to supply short-term 
financing to its member countries with good results. 
Since its creation, the fund has contributed resources 
equivalent on average to 60% of IMF exceptional 
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financing to the Andean Community countries. Among 
the most important features of FLAR lending are its 
speed and timeliness.
Would it be possible to include more of the 
region’s countries in this fund? An analysis of the 
correlation between different variables that can be 
regarded as indicators of external shocks shows that 
extending the geographical coverage of the Latin 
American Reserve Fund would indeed be feasible. In 
other words, although the region’s countries are affected 
by similar financial shocks and there is evidence of 
regional contagion, the expanded FLAR could operate 
effectively if it carried out emergency lending to more 
countries in the region. The correlation coefficients of 
detrended series of international reserves tend to be low 
and non-significant (only 17 out of 45 are significant at 
the 5% level). Terms-of-trade correlations do not show 
a clear pattern either. There is a mixture of negative and 
positive coefficients of smaller and larger magnitudes, 
with only 15 of the 45 coefficients being positive 
and significant. Private capital inflows show positive 
correlations, but they are generally not close to unity. 
These results coincide with those reported by Urrutia 
(2006), Machinea (2003) and Agosin (2000).
Pooling international reserves offers participant 
countries two possible benefits: access to increased 
reserve holdings, and a possible reduction in reserve 
volatility. Estimates for 10 of the region’s economies 
show that countries with more volatile international 
reserves would tend to benefit from a reserve pooling 
arrangement. Conversely, lower-volatility countries such 
as Chile and Colombia would be worse off. This implies 
that there would be incentive problems for countries 
with reserves that are high relative to their volatility.
When it comes to markets in government securities 
incorporating more economic variables, we find that the 
development of markets in local currency-denominated 
domestic inflation-indexed bonds, GDP-indexed bonds 
and commodity price-indexed bonds has been a 
slow and difficult process because of coordination 
problems, lack of confidence in the countries’ policies, 
and problems of transparency and surveillance. The 
proposal of this paper is that subregional development 
banks, together with the Latin American Reserve Fund, 
should complement the current efforts of the IDB and 
World Bank to promote the creation of markets for 
instruments of this type.
Deepening financial integration creates needs and 
incentives for stronger macroeconomic coordination. 
One way to speed up the slow progress seen in the 
region would be to combine ‘soft’ coordination with 
information-sharing and the creation of supranational 
forums for policy debate, which would enable countries to 
become better acquainted and improve their understanding 
of one another. A stricter form of coordination would 
mean establishing goals for the convergence of a set 
of macroeconomic variables. Given that one of the 
mandates of the Latin American Reserve Fund is to 
promote macroeconomic coordination, the convergence 
targets could also provide the basis for the conditionality 
of the fund, if compliance with the targets were a 
prerequisite for requesting countries to receive assistance 
from it.
Lastly, it should be stressed that regional financial 
agreements supplement global arrangements but do 
not replace them, and a guiding principle in regional 
f inancial integration processes should be that of 
additionality vis-à-vis the global financial architecture. 
By the same token, subregional development banks and 
the Latin American Reserve Fund need to coordinate 
with other international financial institutions to promote 
financing instruments that are designed to further the 
countries’ financial development.
(Original: English)
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Appendix
FIGURE A.1
Latin America (10 countries): Trends in international reserve stocks
(Millions of dollars)
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TABLE A.1
Latin America (10 countries): Simple correlation coefficients, 1990-2005
International reserves
 Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Peru Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
      (Bol. Rep. of)
Bolivia 1         
Colombia 0.8551* 1        
Costa Rica 0.8308* 0.8117* 1       
Ecuador 0.7626* 0.7554* 0.5083 1      
Peru 0.9446* 0.9168* 0.7862* 0.8463* 1     
Venezuela (B.R.) 0.7572* 0.7962* 0.7978* 0.5710* 0.7071* 1    
Argentina 0.7426* 0.3941 0.4904 0.6151* 0.6075* 0.5103 1   
Brazil 0.6184* 0.6256* 0.2749 0.8111* 0.7437* 0.3914 0.4711 1  
Chile 0.7966* 0.6984* 0.4902 0.8484* 0.8875* 0.4307 0.6240* 0.8867* 1 
Mexico 0.7559* 0.8526* 0.9330* 0.4522 0.7428* 0.7669* 0.2684 0.2565 0.4048 1
Detrended international reserves
 Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Peru Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
      (Bol. Rep. of)
Bolivia 1         
Colombia 0.3574 1        
Costa Rica 0.2353 -0.1345 1       
Ecuador 0.5483* 0.5803* -0.1267 1      
Peru 0.7117* 0.6669* -0.0954 0.8067* 1     
Venezuela (B.R.) 0.6101* 0.5173* 0.5682* 0.3378 0.4624 1    
Argentina 0.8084* 0.1220 0.5063 0.4328 0.4710 0.5854* 1   
Brazil 0.4098 0.6420* -0.3467 0.6969* 0.7810* 0.2738 0.1907 1  
Chile 0.4747 0.6663* -0.1628 0.7167* 0.8698* 0.3371 0.3114 0.8385* 1 
Mexico -0.1100 0.0102 0.4509 -0.3114 -0.3423 0.3637 -0.0955 0.3391 -0.4069 1
Variation of international reserves
 Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Peru Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
      (Bol. Rep. of)
Bolivia 1         
Colombia 0.3841 1        
Costa Rica 0.1101 -0.1271 1       
Ecuador 0.4514 0.2692 0.0280 1      
Peru 0.4341 0.6731* 0.0211 0.5594* 1     
Venezuela (B.R.) 0.6537* 0.3088 0.4575 0.3736 0.3505 1    
Argentina 0.6474* 0.0433 0.3283 0.3615 0.2506 0.5736* 1   
Brazil 0.2402 0.3420 -0.3035 0.2013 0.3577 0.1751 0.1000 1  
Chile 0.2197 0.4682 -0.0026 0.3032 0.7161* 0.1869 0.1471 0.5546* 1 
Mexico 0.0057 -0.0830 0.3695 -0.0592 -0.3289 0.2609 -0.0213 -0.2044 -0.4694 1
Continued on the following page
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Table A.1 (continued)
Terms of trade
 Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Peru Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
      (Bol. Rep. of)
Bolivia 1         
Colombia -0.3857 1        
Costa Rica -0.0265 -0.5212* 1       
Ecuador -0.4364 0.8548* -0.3141 1      
Peru 0.1353 0.4311 0.1345 0.3264 1     
Venezuela (B.R.) -0.2040 0.9195* -0.6262* 0.8300* 0.4396 1    
Argentina -0.5025 0.7688* -0.2849 0.6323* 0.4609 0.6951* 1   
Brazil -0.5120 0.2333 0.4063 0.2700 0.2989 -0.0237 0.4723 1  
Chile -0.2032 0.8929* -0.5168* 0.7543* 0.5623* 0.8779* 0.6892* 0.2755 1 
Mexico -0.6184* 0.8073* -0.4232 0.8840* 0.0798 0.7219* 0.6421* 0.3617 0.7373* 1
Export prices
 Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Peru Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
      (Bol. Rep. of)
Bolivia 1         
Colombia 0.5243* 1        
Costa Rica 0.0070 -0.3307 1       
Ecuador 0.4632 0.9092* –0.3639 1      
Peru 0.8071* 0.7441* 0.1447 0.6413* 1     
Venezuela (B.R.) 0.4704 0.8792* 0.5519* 0.9102* 0.5932* 1    
Argentina 0.5756* 0.5880* 0.3737 0.4233 0.8231* 0.3032 1   
Brazil 0.6666* 0.5601* 0.4638 0.4212 0.8108* 0.2344 0.8566* 1
Chile 0.7595* 0.8658* –0.0446 0.7182* 0.8900* 0.6754* 0.6998* 0.7918* 1 
Mexico 0.2650 0.8808* –0.3315 0.8635* 0.5191* 0.8606* 0.3494 0.3781 0.7017* 1
Capital flows
 Bolivia Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Peru Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
      (Bol. Rep. of)
Bolivia 1         
Colombia 0.2769 1        
Costa Rica -0.0359 -0.4145 1       
Ecuador 0.3048 0.4135 -0.1336 1      
Peru 0.1488 0.5593* -0.4953 0.0972 1     
Venezuela (B.R.) 0.3965 0.0319 -0.2219 -0.1989 0.1681 1    
Argentina 0.6836* 0.3872 -0.5573* 0.0972 0.4093 0.4964 1   
Brazil 0.6046* 0.6547* -0.1858 -0.0183 0.4382 0.3278 0.5000 1  
Chile 0.4935 0.4956 -0.3870 0.1212 0.6923* 0.0766 0.5912* 0.6294*  1 
Mexico 0.2735 -0.3849 -0.0200 0.0505 0.2172 0.0372 0.2922 -0.2847 0.3460 1
Source: Prepared by the authors with data from the World Bank (various years) and ECLAC.
* Coefficient significant at a 5% level.
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